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In Search Of Things Past And Future: 
Judicial Activism And Corporate 
Purpose
EDWARD J. WAITZER* AND DOUGLAS SARRO**
Corporate purpose does not lend itself to any clear or constant definition. Rather, courts’ 
understanding of corporate purpose adapts over time to reflect evolving social norms and 
expectations as to the proper role of the corporation in society. We use the oppression 
remedy under Canadian corporate law to explore how Canadian courts have and will continue 
to play a key role in shifting legal and market understandings of corporate purpose towards 
a more long-termist, stakeholder-focused perspective. We begin by exploring the rationale 
for moving the law in this direction, outlining some of the causes and effects of short-term 
horizons on corporate and investment manager decision making, and how ideology and 
overly conservative legal advice contribute to this dynamic. We then outline an emerging role 
for judicial activism in breaking the log jam and helping us to re-focus on the real strength of 
capitalism—its flexibility to evolve and respond to a society’s expressed needs.
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THE DEFINITION OF CORPORATE PURPOSE has been a perennial subject of 
legal (and other) discussion. During the 1930s it was the subject of a historic 
debate between Professors Adolf Berle and E. Merrick Dodd in the Harvard Law 
Review.1 While Berle argued for what is now referred to as “shareholder primacy,” 
Dodd advanced a view of the business corporation as an “economic institution 
which has a social service as well as profit-making function.”2 Berle agreed, 
however, that shareholders of widely held public companies lacked the practical 
power to hold management accountable for its actions,3 and, in a 1954 lecture 
series, he conceded Dodd’s contention that management accountability needed 
to come from regulators, customers, and others in the public sphere, as only 
they had sufficient power to oversee and monitor corporate conduct.4 In doing 
so, Berle effectively embraced a stakeholder-based model of corporate purpose. 
This reflected the marketplace reality of the day, in which the most significant 
“countervailing powers” to managerial and board action were employees, through 
their unions, and regulators.5
Over time, US and Canadian jurisprudence have taken different paths on 
this issue, one which continues to attract robust debate to this day. The current 
jurisprudence in the United States, led by the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
1. AA Berle Jr, “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust” (1931) 44:7 Harv L Rev 1049; E Merrick 
Dodd Jr, “For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?” (1932) 45:7 Harv L Rev 1145.
2. Dodd, supra note 1 at 1148.
3. Adolf A Berle & Gardiner C Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, revised ed 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968) at 78–84.
4. Adolf A Berle Jr, The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
Company, 1954) at 169; David J Berger, “In Search of Lost Time: What if Delaware Had 
Not Adopted Shareholder Primacy?” in Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall Thomas, eds, 
The Corporate Contract in Changing Times: Is the Law Keeping Up? (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press) [forthcoming].
5. Berger, supra note 4 at 12.
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decisions in Unocal6 and Revlon,7 lies squarely within the shareholder primacy 
camp.8 In contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada clearly articulated a stakeholder 
primacy view in its BCE decision.9
The reality is that neither standard is static. As William T. Allen, 
then-Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery, wrote (following the 
Unocal and Revlon decisions), “[t]he questions ‘What is a corporation?’ and ‘For 
whose benefit do directors hold power?’ are … not simply technical questions 
of law capable of resolution through analytical rule manipulation.”10 Rather, 
in defining corporate purpose, “we implicitly express our view of the nature and 
purpose of our social life,” issues to which there can be no clear or constant 
response.11 As a result,
our law of corporate entities is bound itself to be contentious and controversial. It 
will be worked out, not deduced. In this process, efficiency concerns, ideology and 
interest group politics will commingle with history (including our semi-autonomous 
corporation law) to produce an answer that will hold for here and now, only to be 
torn by some future stress and to be reformulated once more. And so on, and so 
on, evermore.12
Chancellor Allen understood that corporate purpose is an area where, 
as Robert Cover put it, thinking about the trajectory of the law requires more 
than an understanding of “the [legal] precepts, but also their connections to 
possible and plausible states of affairs. It requires that one integrate not only the 
‘is’ and the ‘ought,’ but the ‘is,’ the ‘ought,’ and the ‘what might be.’”13
We have explored elsewhere how the doctrine of reasonable expectations has 
evolved into a powerful tool for judicial and regulatory activism and, as a result, 
a bellwether for the trajectory of the law, allowing courts to reach beyond existing 
legal rights to achieve fair outcomes for those harmed by the actions of powerful 
6. Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co, 493 A (2d) 946 (Del 1985).
7. Revlon, Inc v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc, 506 A (2d) 173 (Del 1986).
8. See Leo E Strine Jr, “The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of 
the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware Generation Corporation 
Law” (2015) 50:3 Wake Forest L Rev 761.
9. BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560 [BCE].
10. William T Allen, “Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation” (1992) 14:2 
Cardozo L Rev 261 at 280-81 [emphasis in original].
11. Ibid at 281.
12. Ibid.
13. Robert M Cover, “The Supreme Court, 1982 Term — Foreword: Nomos and Narrative” 
(1983) 97:1 Harv L Rev 4 at 10.
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persons and entities.14 Because human behaviour is affected by expectations of 
others’ behaviour and attitudes, changes in social norms can give rise to tipping 
points for behavioural change.15 They can also give rise to legal change: Where the 
law is in a state of transition, expectations contribute to reform. Posner describes 
this dynamic as follows:
[Judicial d]ecisions are not the only source of expectations—far from it. Changing 
the law to bring it into closer harmony with lay intuitions of justice and fair dealings 
may protect rather than defeat the parties’ expectations.16
This article uses the oppression remedy under Canadian corporate law to 
explore how corporate law will continue to be subject to the vicissitudes of social 
norms and expectations. In doing so, we take a normative view as to the trajectory 
of the law and, unlike Berle,17 suggest that the courts (in Canada, at least) will 
and should continue to be key players in the evolution of corporate purpose. 
In particular, we illustrate how the Supreme Court of Canada has significantly 
expanded the scope of the Canadian oppression remedy, well beyond what 
was originally contemplated by the legislative draftspersons. We argue that the 
Court has done so in a way that provides considerable scope for stakeholders to 
encourage and discipline “long-termism” in corporate decision making.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. First, we outline some of the 
causes and effects of short-term horizons on corporate and investment manager 
decision making. In a world in which an “at-all-costs” approach to growth is no 
longer sustainable,18 we must refocus on governance models aimed at generating 
14. Edward J Waitzer & Douglas Sarro, “Protecting Reasonable Expectations: Mapping the 
Trajectory of the Law” (2016) 57:3 Can Bus LJ 285.
15. Karine Nyborg et al, “Social norms as solutions” (2016) 354:6308 Science 42; H Peyton 
Young, “The Evolution of Social Norms” (2015) 7:1 Ann Rev Econ 359.
16. Richard A Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1990) at 260.
17. Berle & Means, supra note 3 at 296.
18. See Generation Foundation, The Transformation of Growth: How Sustainable Capitalism 
Can Drive a New Economic Order (2017), online: <www.genfound.org/media/1436/
pdf-genfoundwp2017-final.pdf>. The authors warn that, “[w]e need to pursue a more 
inclusive form of growth, so the benefits of capitalism are shared more widely. If not, 
we would run the risk of still more popular rejection of capitalism and its associated liberties 
– which, in our view, would lead to even worse outcomes in the future” (ibid at 4). See also 
Oxford Martin Commission on Future Generations, Now for the Long Term: The Report 
of the Oxford Martin Commission on Future Generations (Oxford: Oxford Martin School, 
2013), online: <www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/commission/Oxford_Martin_
Now_for_the_Long_Term.pdf>. The authors note that “[r]isks arising from the plundering 
of our planet’s natural capital, growing inequality, and the potentially devastating results of 
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financial returns today without compromising our ability to create value in the 
future.19 As part of this discussion, we consider the challenges and opportunities 
this poses for decision making by companies and asset owners and managers, 
and how static, conservative legal advice may pose an obstacle to meeting these 
challenges. Second, we outline the emerging role for judicial activism in breaking 
the logjam and helping us to re-focus on the real strength of capitalism—its 
flexibility to evolve and respond to a society’s expressed needs. Our particular 
focus is the possibility of expanding the range of potential claimants under the 
oppression remedy.
I.  THE CHALLENGE OF SHORT-TERM HORIZONS
The global narrative of progress, and the role of the public corporation as an 
engine of growth, productivity, innovation and, ultimately, societal prosperity, 
is increasingly being called into question.20 At the same time, in the face of often 
weak or ineffective political institutions, there has been a growing focus on the 
importance of the large allocators of capital (public pension and sovereign wealth 
funds) and users of capital (taken to be public corporations) both as contributors 
to and possible sources of solutions for the systemic problems we face.21
Views on the proper role of the public corporation are shifting—from the 
narrow view of the corporation as a profit-maximizing enterprise that exists solely 
to serve the immediate interests of shareholders, to a broader understanding of the 
corporation as both an economic and social institution, with responsibilities to a 
range of stakeholders in addition to current shareholders, and with a responsibility 
accidental or deliberate use of new technologies are among the reasons we urgently need to 
deepen our understanding of the threats posed by business as usual” (ibid at 9).
19. Generation Foundation, supra note 18.
20. See e.g. Dezsö Horváth & Dominic Barton, “Capitalism Re-Imagined” in Dominic Barton, 
Dezsö Horváth & Matthias Kipping, eds, Re-Imagining Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016) 319 at 319-20. Barton & Horvath observe that “[o]ne of the fallouts 
of the financial crisis is that public trust in capitalism has sunk to an all-time low in many 
developed countries” (ibid).
21. Rebecca Henderson & Karthik Ramanna, Do Managers Have a Role to Play in Sustaining 
the Institutions of Capitalism? (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Center for Effective 
Public Management, 2015) at 3, online: <www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
BrookingsInstitutionsofCapitalismv5.pdf>. Such problems include environmental (e.g., 
climate change and access to fresh water), social (e.g., rising income inequality, access to 
health care and human and labour rights), and financial (e.g., the stability and credibility of 
financial intermediation) trends and issues.
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and critical role to play in fostering economic and societal sustainability.22 So, 
too, with respect to views on the proper role of major asset owners and managers, 
which reflect a growing recognition of the broader context of their investment 
impacts and, accordingly, the need to manage risks and rewards at systems levels, 
as well as at the portfolio level.23 In each case, there is a growing awareness of 
the challenge presented by incentive mismatches that tend to foster an unduly 
short-term focus on the part of key decision makers.24
As Lynn Stout has argued,25 the board-controlled corporation historically 
functioned as a means of creating and preserving wealth and prosperity 
for the benefit of future as well as present generations, thereby promoting 
intergenerational efficiency and equity. The same ideal is central to defined 
benefit pension plans and sovereign wealth funds.26 Yet the modern embrace 
of “shareholder value” and “shareholder democracy” as ideals, unbridled by the 
mediating role of directors focused on long-term, sustainable growth, threatens 
to damage these important functions just when their social utility has become 
more widely recognized. Analogous concerns have arisen with respect to the 
efficacy and integrity of governance structures in many investor organizations.27
22. See e.g. BCE, supra note 9; California Public Employees’ Retirement System, Governance & 
Sustainability Principles (Sacramento: California Public Employees’ Retirement System, 2017) 
at 31, online: <www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/governance-and-sustainability-
principles.pdf>; Andrew Crane & Dirk Matten, “Engagement Required: The Changing Role 
of the Corporation in Society” in Barton, Horváth & Kipping, supra note 20 at 116.
23. Steve Lydenberg, Systems-Level Considerations and the Long-Term Investor: Definitions, 
Examples, and Actions (The Investment Integration Project, 2017), online: <www.
tiiproject.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/Systems_Level_Considerations_Long_
Term_Investor.pdf>.
24. See e.g. John Kay, Kay review of UK equity markets and long-term decision-making (2012), 
online:  <assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/31544/12-631-kay-review-of-equity-markets-interim-report.pdf> [Kay, Kay Review].
25. Lynn Stout, “The Corporation as Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational 
Efficiency, and the Corporate Form” (2015) 38:2 Seattle UL Rev 685.
26. John Kay, Other People’s Money: The Real Business of Finance (New York: Public Affairs, 2015) 
at 239 [Kay, Other People’s Money].
27. See Kay, Kay Review, supra note 24 at 39-42; Simon Zadek, Mira Merme & Richard 
Samans, Mainstreaming Responsible Investment (Switzerland: World Economic 
Forum, 2005), online: <www.griequity.com/resources/integraltech/GRIMarket/
MainstreamingResponsibleInvestment.pdf>. The report quotes Simon Zadek in his 
presentation at the International Corporate Governance Network’s July 2004 Annual 
Conference in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (see ibid at 19); Amin Rajan, DB & DC Plans: 
Strengthening Their Delivery (Tunbridge Wells: CREATE-Research, 2008) at 22.
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An analysis of the recent DuPont settlement,28 in which the company paid 
more than 670 million US dollars to settle claims over emissions of a toxic 
chemical used in the making of Teflon, is instructive. Professors Roy Shapira and 
Luigi Zingales point out that even though preventing pollution would have cost 
less than the damages caused by pollution, the corporate decision to pollute—
which in this case was made in a deliberate and informed manner—was rational, 
at least from the perspective of maximizing the short-term financial interests 
of shareholders.29 The immediate costs of polluting would be borne by others, 
and any damages, penalties, or reputational harm for which the company or its 
managers ultimately might be accountable are discounted by both the probability 
of detection and the time lags between the decision to pollute and the detection 
of pollution, and between detection and enforcement.30 Accordingly, existing 
legal mechanisms of control failed to deter corporate conduct that was both 
wrongful and, from a social perspective, inefficient.31
The Governor of the Bank of England recently spoke about the need to 
break the “tragedy of the horizon” with respect to “the catastrophic impacts of 
climate change [that] will be felt beyond the traditional time horizons of most 
actors—imposing a cost on future generations that the current generation has 
no incentive to fix.”32 We face the same dilemma with respect to many other 
public policy concerns. Indeed, inter-generational equity may well be the 
defining policy challenge of our time. Decision making that focuses on the next 
quarter, rather than the longer-term sustainability of the enterprise (or pension 
promise), that assumes efficient markets, ignores externalities and systemic risks, 
and relies on narrow compliance with existing (often outdated and ineffective) 
regulatory frameworks is increasingly suspect and, arguably, has become a driver 
28. DuPont, Press Release, “DuPont Reaches Global Settlement of Multi-District PFOA 
Litigation” (13 February 2017) online: <www.dupont.com/corporate-functions/
media-center/press-releases/dupont-reaches-global-settlement-of-multi-district-pfoa-
litigation.html>.
29. Roy Shapira & Luigi Zingales, “Is Pollution Value-Maximizing? The DuPont Case” 
(version dated 1 September 2017) at 2-3, online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3037091>.
30. Ibid at 20-21.
31. Ibid at 33.
32. Mark Carney, “Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon – climate change and financial 
stability” (Speech delivered at Lloyd’s of London, 29 September 2015) at 4, online: <www.
bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/speech/2015/breaking-the-tragedy-of-the-horizon-
climate-change-and-financial-stability.pdf>.
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of the widening trust gap that tears at the fabric of our major economic and 
political institutions.33
A. THE PROBLEM WITH CORPORATE DECISION MAKING
It has been over a decade since the Supreme Court of Canada held in BCE that 
“[i]n considering what is in the best interests of the corporation, directors may 
look to the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers, 
governments and the environment to inform their decisions,”34 and that fiduciary 
duty “is not confined to short-term profit or share value,” but “looks to the 
long-term interests of the corporation.”35 Yet, when it comes to governance, 
corporate boards appear to be consumed by the short term.
For example, there has been significant activity and debate in recent years over 
issues like proxy access, majority voting, and other seemingly “low stakes” issues—
debates that, it has been suggested, are primarily “symbolic.”36 In contrast, little 
progress has been made on cutting the Gordian knot of executive compensation, 
which, due to a combination of perverse incentives created by tax laws and other 
regulations, mass adherence to the ideology of “pay for performance,” and the 
perceived imperative to keep executive pay in line with peers’ pay practices, has 
skyrocketed since the early 1990s.37 And Canadian companies have done little to 
33. Edelman, 2017 Edelman Trust Barometer Global Report, online: <www.edelman.com/
trust2017> (finding that “[t]he general population’s trust in all four key institutions—
business, government, NGOs, and media—has declined broadly”); Edelman, 2018 Edelman 
Trust Barometer Global Report, online: <cms.edelman.com/sites/default/files/2018-02/2018_
Edelman_Trust_Barometer_Global_Report_FEB.pdf> (finding results substantially similar 
to those found in the prior year).
34. BCE, supra note 9 at para 40. See also Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of ) v Wise, 2004 
SCC 68, [2004] 3 SCR 461 [Peoples].
35. BCE, supra note 9 at para 38.
36. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, “Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics” (2014) 
94:6 BU L Rev 1997.
37. See Andrew CW Lund, “Tax’s Triviality as a Pay-Reforming Device” (2012) 57:3 Vill L 
Rev 571; Hugessen Consulting, Highlights from the 2017 Proxy Season – TSX 60: CEO Pay 
Bucks the Market Trend (2017) at 3, online: <www.hugessen.com/sites/default/files/news/
Hugessen%202017%20TSX%2060%20Briefing.pdf> (finding that CEO pay within the 
TSX 60 has been relatively flat since 2012, but still averages at over $7 million per year).
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adapt to a rapidly changing world by increasing the diversity of their boards and 
executive officers.38
Moreover, given market participants’ continuing focus on narrow, quarterly 
financial metrics,39 there seems to be little or no incentive to curb financial 
engineering tactics undertaken by companies, such as repurchasing shares or 
adjusting stated earnings to manipulate share-based metrics (other than solely 
as means of returning capital to shareholders or better reflecting performance, 
respectively), which, in turn, influence perceptions of performance to help get 
boards re-elected and justify high executive pay.40
We argue that boards’ reluctance to act on important issues and use the 
significant resources available to them to promote the long-term interests of 
corporate stakeholders reflects the continued dominance of shareholder primacy 
as a market ideology—the lingering view that a company’s board must act in 
the best interests of shareholders, and that the best interests of shareholders 
are best determined by listening to a company’s most vocal shareholders—
notwithstanding Canadian courts’ adoption of a long-term, stakeholder-based 
view of corporate purpose.
As Berle noted, shareholder primacy was intended to prevent boards from 
being captured by management and deal with the problem of “agency costs”—
the costs imposed on investors (principals) when management (agents) waste 
resources by, among other things, investing in projects that are not worthwhile 
or awarding themselves above-market compensation.41 But taking this view 
guides us to the conclusion that, when boards take action that is contrary to 
the expressed wishes of major shareholders, or when boards cite considerations 
38. Canadian Securities Administrators, CSA Multilateral Staff Notice 58-309: Staff Review of 
Women on Boards and in Executive Officer Positions – Compliance with NI 58-101 Disclosure 
of Corporate Governance Practices (5 October 2017) at 3, online: <www.osc.gov.on.ca/
documents/en/Securities-Category5/sn_20171005_58-309_staff-review-women-on-
boards.pdf>; Nicholas Keung, “Ryerson study highlights severe lack of visible minorities 
on corporate boards,” Toronto Star (4 October 2017), online: <www.thestar.com/news/
immigration/2017/10/04/ryerson-study-highlights-severe-lack-of-visible-minorities-on-
corporate-boards.html>.
39. Focusing Capital on the Long Term, Straight talk for the long term: How to improve the 
investor-corporate dialogue (Boston: FCLT Global, March 2015) at 2, online: <www.
fcltglobal.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/straight-talk-for-the-long-
term_summary-vfo2263494db5326c50be1cff0000423a91.pdf>.
40. William Lazonick, “Profits Without Prosperity,” Harvard Business Review (September 2014), 
online: <hbr.org/2014/09/profits-without-prosperity>.
41. AA Berle Jr, “For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note” (1932) 45:8 Harv L 
Rev 1365 at 1367. See also Lynn A Stout, “Bad and Not-so-Bad Arguments for Shareholder 
Primacy (2002) 75:5 S Cal L Rev 1189.
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apart from shareholder value to justify their actions, one should presume that the 
board is in fact acting to deliver disproportionate benefits to management and 
destroy shareholder value. It implies that boards have no independent legitimacy 
to act, or credibility when acting, on behalf of the best interests of a company 
and its stakeholders—that their legitimacy flows solely from shareholder support.
The problem of agency costs is real, but by focusing on it exclusively we 
overlook the problem of “principal costs”—costs imposed on investors as a whole, 
as well as other stakeholders, as a result of a company pursuing the interests and 
priorities of particular groups of investors at the expense of others.42 The interests 
and priorities of a company’s most vocal and influential shareholders, whose 
influence may be magnified through “empty voting” and other techniques for 
increasing an entity’s voting power relative to its economic stake in a company,43 
may not reflect the interests of a company’s shareholder base as a whole, let 
alone the interests and expectations of other stakeholders. The most obvious 
way to distinguish different constituencies of investors may be their investment 
horizon—relatively short-term investors would favour an immediate return of 
capital in the form of dividends or stock buybacks to long-term investment 
projects that could dampen earnings in the short-term, for example.
Another factor to consider is that many large investors are actually agents 
themselves, hedge fund and pension fund portfolio managers, with agency 
conflicts of their own. For example, a highly-compensated portfolio manager 
has little incentive to throw stones in a glass house by questioning skyrocketing 
executive compensation.44 Further, as these agent-investors’ firms benefit from the 
increasing financialization of the economy by collecting fees for advising on and 
otherwise facilitating financial transactions such as stock buybacks and leveraged 
buyouts, one should not be surprised that they have not sought to discourage 
these activities even though they arguably destroy value in the long-run.45 
Hence a recent study of over 1,700 equity strategies with at least three years of 
consecutive data found that managers turn over their portfolios every 1.7 years 
42. Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, “Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and 
Governance” (2017) 117:3 Colum L Rev 767.
43. Henry TC Hu, “Financial Innovation and Governance Mechanisms: The Evolution of 
Decoupling and Transparency” (2015) 70:2 Bus Lawyer 347.
44. Harriet Agnew & Linda Noonan, “Asset managers’ pay set to beat investment 
bankers,” Financial Times (15 February 2015), online: <www.ft.com/
content/37cce456-b507-11e4-b186-00144feab7de>.
45. Kay, Other People’s Money, supra note 26 at 193-94.
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on average.46 Such short-termism creates time horizon mismatches between asset 
owners, asset managers, securities issuers, and consumers of financial products, 
causing companies to overlook profitable long-term investment opportunities 
and to ignore long-term risks.47
The preferences and priorities of these agent-investors may also be shaped by 
the demographics of their respective investor bases. To the extent they consider 
systemic risks,48 hedge funds with wealthier investor bases49 may take the view 
that they have greater capacity to protect themselves from the costs of inequality, 
climate change, and other global challenges and, therefore, may be less likely to 
support or advocate for companies’ investment in initiatives intended to promote 
environmental and social progress than pension funds, which have longer term 
obligations and a more diverse range of participants. Differences in ideology may 
also be a factor. Wealthier individuals tend to be more ideologically conservative 
than the population more broadly.50 Millennials are more likely than older 
investors to support their investment managers’ taking environmental and social 
factors into consideration when making investment decisions.51
Given that hedge funds and similar entities with similar investor demographics 
tend to be more vocal and, as a result, more influential than other institutional 
investors, these differences have significant implications for the capital markets. 
Indeed, Professor John Coffee notes that “the discretion that directors and 
managers once possessed to consider the public interest and morality is shrinking 
as a result of hedge fund activism.”52 He points to the example of NRG Energy, 
46. Alex Bernhardt, “Consequences of Short-Term Investment,” top1000funds.com (23 
August 2017), online: <www.top1000funds.com/2017/08/consequences-of-short-term-
investment>. See generally 2° Investing Initiative, “Tragedy of the Horizon,” online: <www.
tragedyofthehorizon.com/#context>.
47. Bernhardt, supra note 46.
48. Systematic risk is something that investors may not be able to diversify away from. Systemic 
risk is something that could be a source of contagion that extends across markets.
49. See Leo E Strine Jr, “Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on 
Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System” (2017) 126:6 Yale LJ 
1870 at 1894-95.
50. See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, “Beyond Campaign Finance Reform” (2016) 57:4 Boston College 
L Rev 1127 at 1139-40; Benjamin I Page, Larry M Bartels & Jason Seawright, “Democracy 
and the Policy Preference of Wealthy Americans,” (2013) 11:1 Perspectives on Politics 51.
51. Ernst & Young LLP, Sustainable investing: the millennial investor (Ernst & Young LLP, 2017) 
at 2, online: <www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-sustainable-investing-the-millennial-
investor-gl/$FILE/ey-sustainable-investing-the-millennial-investor.pdf>.
52. John C Coffee Jr, “The Agency Cost of Activism: Information Leakage, Thwarted Majorities, 
and the Public Morality” (EGCI Law Working Paper No 373/2017, November 2017) at 
37-38, online: <ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/finalcoffee.pdf>.
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Inc., which set a goal of reducing its carbon dioxide emissions by fifty per cent 
by 2013, and ninety per cent by 2050, and began working towards that goal by 
investing in solar and wind power companies, only to sell the assets and abandon 
these goals in the face of pressure from two activist hedge funds.53 He also points 
to evidence that “hedge fund activism is retarding or reversing the movement 
towards greater board diversity,”54 including one 2017 study by Institutional 
Shareholder Services and the Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute 
finding that directors appointed in response to activist pressure or as a result of 
settlement agreements at S&P 1500 companies over 2011–2015 tended to be 
less diverse than the average for that index: only 8.4 per cent were women, and 
only 4.6 per cent were members of an ethnic or racial minority group.55
Relying on shareholder primacy to curb managerial excess may have helped 
to address agency costs, but it has magnified the risk of principal costs, as boards 
have been left without the legitimacy and credibility to act independently of their 
largest and most vocal shareholders by asserting an alternative vision for the best 
interests of the companies they notionally lead. This has led to decision making 
that focuses on the next quarter rather than the long-term success of a company, 
that ignores externalities, and that often relies on compliance with existing 
regulation as a substitute for thinking about sustainability and the interests and 
expectations of stakeholders.
Why are the courts’ and the markets’ understandings of corporate purpose so 
far apart? Part of the reason is that shareholder primacy is more than an ideology 
that influences the outcome of public company shareholder meetings—it is also 
embedded in our statutory corporate law and, in turn, influences the legal advice 
boards receive. We discuss how the nature of legal advice has compounded the 
concerns described above in the next section of this article.
B. THE LEGAL (ADVICE) PROBLEM
Given the expanding body of literature and case law suggesting that boards 
should direct themselves towards the long-term interests of the companies they 
53. Ibid at 36-38.
54. Ibid at 22.
55. By comparison, in 2015, 16.5 per cent of directors at S&P 1500 firms were women, and 
10.1 per cent were minorities. See Andrew Borek, Zachary Friesner & Patrick McGurn, The 
Impact of Shareholder Activism on Board Refreshment Trends at S&P 1500 Firms (New York: 
Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute and Institutional Shareholder Services Inc, 
August 2017) at 17, 20-21, online: <www.irrcinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/
FINAL-Activism-and-Board-Refreshment-Trends-Report-Aug-2017.pdf>; Ibid.
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serve, and are entitled to consider the interests of all stakeholders in doing so,56 
one would think the legal advice given to corporate boards of directors would 
shift over time to reflect a stakeholder-oriented approach. Efforts are underway 
to educate legal professionals, directors, pension fund trustees, and investment 
managers about these developments in fiduciary law.57
And, in fact, when describing the general nature of corporate directors’ 
fiduciary duties and the oppression remedy, the various guides available to 
directors on their legal responsibilities do draw from the stakeholder-oriented 
language from BCE described in Section I above. One such guide notes that 
“fiduciary duty comprehends a duty to treat individual stakeholders affected by 
corporate actions equitably and fairly,”58 while another notes that “oppression 
remedy is a broad and flexible remedy that enables corporate stakeholders to 
challenge corporate actions that are contrary to ‘reasonable expectations,’ even 
when no breach of legal rights has occurred.”59 It is doubtless that any seasoned 
counsel describing the general nature of these legal concepts to a corporate board 
would use similar language.
Issues arise, however, when the discussion of these concepts moves 
past generalities to specific questions about how best to balance the interests 
of specific stakeholders. Scholars have identified possible reasons why the 
stakeholder-oriented statements in BCE may not significantly affect corporate 
governance in practice (and, by implication, the content of the legal advice that 
guides corporate decision making). Professor Poonam Puri notes that, in the 
absence of specific guidance from the Court on how to prioritize competing 
interests, “the board benefits from a significant increase in discretion and decrease 
in litigation risk.”60 Professor Edward Iacobucci notes that, notwithstanding BCE, 
“shareholder primacy … [remains] embedded in corporate law in many ways”: 
56. For a discussion of this evolution of fiduciary duty, see Edward J Waitzer & Douglas Sarro, 
“Fiduciary Society Unleashed: The Road Ahead for the Financial Sector” (2014) 69:4 Bus 
Lawyer 1081 at 1089-97.
57. See Edward J Waitzer & Douglas Sarro, “The Public Fiduciary: Emerging Themes in 
Canadian Fiduciary Law for Pension Trustees” (2012) 91:1 Can Bar Rev 163 at 182, n 102 
and accompanying text.
58. Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP & Institute of Corporate Directors, Directors’ Responsibilities 
in Canada, 6th ed (Toronto: Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP & Institute of Corporate 
Directors, 2014) at 8, online: <www.icd.ca/getmedia/581897ca-d69d-4d4f-a2a2-
ca6b06ef223b/5467_Osler_Directors_Responsibilities_-Canada-FINAL.pdf.aspx>.
59. Torys LLP, Responsibilities of Directors in Canada: A Business Law Guide (Toronto: Torys 
LLP, 2009) at 19.
60. Poonam Puri, “The Future of Stakeholder Interests in Corporate Governance” (2010) 48:3 
Can Bus LJ 427 at 432.
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for example, directors are elected by shareholders.61 These predictions appear, 
at least to some extent, to have been borne out. One prominent practitioner 
states that, on the basis of the law as it currently stands, while
[t]he logic of BCE suggests that it would be wrong for the board simply to defer to 
shareholders or to give shareholders a veto over decisions for which the corporate 
statutes assign responsibility to the board. … [T]he lesson … [from recent judicial 
decisions] for Canadian boards struggling with controversial transactions would 
appear to be: when in doubt, let the shareholders decide.62
Before addressing the considerations reflected in this type of guidance, 
it is necessary to briefly explain the purposes for which legal advice is typically 
sought. First, legal advice generally is not focused on what range of activities is 
permissible, unless a client has already, at least on a preliminary basis, decided 
on a course of action and has asked its advisors to confirm whether this course 
has a reasonable legal basis. In the absence of such direction, legal advice tends to 
focus on identifying for the client the path that minimizes its liability exposure—
typically, the most conservative path available63—and, in the absence of obvious 
conflicts of interest that would make such action inappropriate, that reflects the 
instructions, requests, and priorities of the individuals seeking the advice (as 
opposed to the “client” institution that formally employs the legal adviser).64 
This reflects the dual expectations placed on general counsel as managers of 
their internal legal departments and external counsel—that they will support 
business objectives identified from within the company while helping manage 
and minimize legal risk.65
61. Edward Iacobucci, “Corporate Fiduciary Duties and Prudential Regulation of Financial 
Institutions” (2015) 16:1 Theor Inq L 183 at 189.
62. James C Tory, “Let the shareholders decide,” in M&A: Torys’ Top Trends for 2011 (Toronto: 
Torys LLP, 2011) 8 at 10.
63. Jonathan T Molot, “A Market in Litigation Risk” (2009) 76:1 U Chicago L Rev 367 at 368. 
Molot describes the task of a lawyer as similar to that of a risk manager: “helping clients to 
structure conduct so as to minimize risk” (ibid at 369).
64. See e.g. Law Society of Ontario, Rules of Professional Conduct (Toronto: Law Society of 
Ontario, 2000, as amended) r 3.2-3, Commentary. The commentary accompanying rule 
3.2-3 states that while a corporation “will act and give instructions through its officers, 
directors, employees, members, agents, or representatives, the lawyer should ensure that it is 
the interests of the organization that are to be served and protected.”
65. See e.g. NYSE Governance Services & Barker Gilmore, The Rise of the GC: From Legal Adviser 
to Strategic Adviser (Survey Report) (NYSE Governance Services & Barker Gilmore, 2016), 
online: <www.nyse.com/publicdocs/2016_BarkerGilmore_The_Rise_of_the_GC.pdf>.
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Relatedly, legal advice rarely aims to provide a binary, “yes or no” answer 
to a client’s question.66 When faced with a difficult legal issue, a prudent legal 
adviser will not claim to know with certainty how potential litigants or a court 
will react to the decision a company reaches on that issue.67 Rather, like credit or 
other risk analyses, legal advice is expressed in the language of probability—the 
probability that a litigant will challenge a given action taken by a board, and the 
probability that a given court will reach a decision in favour of that litigant.68 
Legal advisers’ perception of the prevailing ideology among potential litigants 
and courts naturally would be relevant to this analysis, to the extent it helps 
predict their likely behaviour.69
The assessment of the potential consequences of a corporate decision is not 
a purely quantitative exercise. Actions with potential legal consequences involve 
both risk and uncertainty: Risk refers to probabilities that are quantifiable, while 
uncertainty refers to probabilities that cannot be quantified with precision. For 
example, one could estimate the odds of a litigant or a court taking a particular 
action within a general band of confidence, but not with precision. Individuals, 
including lawyers, tend to respond to uncertainty by placing disproportionate 
weight on the worst-case scenario.70 This phenomenon has been blamed, for 
example, for corporate lawyers’ extensive reliance on precedents and overly 
complex contractual terms rather than plain language.71 One’s assessment of the 
worst-case scenario, in turn, may be influenced by availability bias—a tendency 
66. Molot, supra note 63 at 368.
67. See generally Karen Anderson & Julia Black, Legal risks and risks for lawyers (Herbert 
Smith Freehills and London School of Economics Regulatory Reform Forum, June 
2013), online: <www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/projects/lfm/0356o%20LSE%20HSF%20
discussion%20paper_d6.pdf>; Richard Moorhead & Steven Vaughan, Legal Risk: Definition, 
Management and Ethics (University College London Centre for Ethics and Law, 2015), 
online: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2594228>; Richard S Gruner, 
“Lean Law Compliance: Confronting and Overcoming Legal Uncertainty in Business 
Enterprises and Other Complex Organizations” (2014) 11:2 NYUJ L & Bus 247 at 255-56.
68. Molot, supra note 63 at 368.
69. See Robert Samuel Summers, Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1982) at 118. Summers notes the relevance of “the ideologies, 
personalities, and personal values of the judges, their social backgrounds, and the like” to the 
prediction of litigation outcomes (ibid).
70. Eric L Talley, “On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Contractual Conditions” (2009) 34:3 Del J 
Corp L 755 at 766-67, 769-770.
71. Clare A Hill, “Why Contracts Are Written in ‘Legalese’” (2001) 77:1 Chicago-Kent L 
Rev 59 at 67, n 21; Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, “Path Dependence in Corporate 
Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases” (1996) 74:2 Wash 
ULQ 347 at 354.
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to identify with and emphasize events that have already occurred and are easily 
recalled.72 Thus, a lack of prior scenarios, or perceived future scenarios, in which 
non-shareholder stakeholders have pursued or succeeded in an oppression claim 
may influence practitioners’ perception of the legal risk of corporate decisions 
that prioritize one set of stakeholders’ interests over another’s.
With these considerations in mind, we turn to the legal structures governing 
the exercise of corporate fiduciary duties. As discussed above, fiduciary duties 
permit boards to take a long-term perspective and to consider the effects their 
decisions will have on stakeholders. In fact, there is a significant body of literature 
suggesting that such a long-term and broader perspective is beneficial both to a 
company and its shareholders over the long-term.73 But boards seeking to take 
such a perspective face two legal challenges. First, as a general proposition, only 
shareholders (and, in some jurisdictions, creditors) have a recognized right to sue 
boards for breaches of fiduciary duty or other actions that disregard their interests 
under corporate law. Second, it is far easier to file and prove a claim alleging 
disregard of shareholders’ short-term financial interests than to prove a claim 
alleging harms caused by unsustainable behavior.
The first challenge is a product of existing statute and case law. In Canada, 
while the oppression remedy is an avenue for challenging corporate conduct that 
unfairly disregards stakeholder interests, not just for closely-held companies, 
72. Ian Weinstein, “Don’t Believe Everything You Think: Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision 
Making” (2003) 9:2 Clinical L Rev 783 at 815, n 88.
73. See e.g. Dominic Barton, James Manyika & Sarah Keohane Williamson, “Finally, Evidence 
that Managing for the Long Term Pays Off,” Harvard Business Review (7 February 2017), 
online: <hbr.org/2017/02/finally-proof-that-managing-for-the-long-term-pays-off>; 
Bruce Simpson & Tiffany Vogel, “Building the Right Long-Term Approach: The Power of 
Aligning Leadership, Strategy, and Execution” in Barton, Horváth & Kipping, supra note 
20, 264 at 269-71.
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but for large private and public companies as well,74 to date (with a few narrow 
exceptions) only shareholders and creditors have been recognized as having access 
to this remedy.75 Groups representing non-shareholder, non-creditor employees, 
customers, the environment or other parties affected by corporate actions, 
typically have not been recognized as having standing to challenge a board’s 
decisions under corporate law.76 Rather than considering how to minimize 
litigation risk from all stakeholders for breaches of statutory or fiduciary duties, 
it follows that legal advisers focus on how to mitigate litigation risk from those 
stakeholders who can actually litigate; which, based on the law as it currently 
exists, are most often shareholders. That shareholders have available to them 
additional mechanisms for challenging a board’s conduct, including through 
shareholder meetings and proceedings brought under securities laws, further 
skews the analysis in their favour.77
The second challenge is an evidentiary one. Short-term financial harms are 
easy to quantify and, accordingly, assert in litigation—one need only choose a 
financial performance metric, be it revenue, net income, or changes in share 
74. Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44, s 241 [CBCA]. Section 
241(2) provides that
[i]f, on an application [by a complainant for an order under s 241], the court is satisfied that 
in respect of a corporation or any of its affiliates
a. any act or omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates effects a result,
b. the business or affairs of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or have been carried 
on or conducted in a manner, or
c. the powers of the directors of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or have been 
exercised in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly 
disregards the interests of any security holder, creditor, director or officer, the court may 
make an order to rectify the matters complained of.
75. See Poonam Puri, “The Hallmarks of Good Corporate Law: A Performance Evaluation of the 
Canadian Business Corporations Act” (Submitted to Corporations Canada, Industry Canada, 
16 January 2004) at 21, online: <digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1114&context=reports>.
76. Employee groups have sought, but not succeeded, in being recognized as proper persons 
to pursue oppression claims. See e.g. Air Canada Pilots Assn v Air Canada ACE Aviation 
Holdings Inc (2007), 26 BLR (4th) 124, 154 ACWS (3d) 592 (Ont Sup Ct), aff’d 2008 
ONCA 531, 45 BLR (4th) 199 [Air Canada]. In one case, discussed in Section II below, 
a monitor appointed under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-36, 
was recognized as a complainant that could bring claims on behalf of creditors who included 
“trade creditors, pensioners and retirees,” and a municipal government. See Ernst & Young Inc 
v Essar Global Fund Limited, 2017 ONCA 1014, 139 OR (3d) 1 at para 61 [Ernst & Young].
77. Tory, supra note 62; Iacobucci, supra note 61 at 189.
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price, and compare the company’s performance with its prior performance or 
the current performance of a peer group or an index. In contrast, the long-term 
costs of unsustainable actions, or other actions that disregard the interests of 
non-shareholder stakeholders, or that disregard the preferences and long-term 
interests of shareholders who understand the connection between their financial 
interests and that of a sustainable, fair economy, are difficult to quantify 
prospectively and even more difficult to attribute to a particular firm.78 The 
difficulty in quantifying the environmental or social costs of corporate action 
also may have prospective effects on corporate action, as individuals tend to 
focus on consequences that seem measurable and concrete over those that are 
less measurable, less immediate, and more abstract.79 These considerations would 
naturally lead legal advisers to narrow their focus even further, from the threat 
of shareholder lawsuits generally to the threat of shareholder lawsuits asserting 
concrete, quantifiable, and immediate harms.
Because of the doctrine of stare decisis, the evolution of law is at least 
somewhat path dependent: The first case on an issue to reach the courts may 
determine the rule governing like cases for many years to come. Hence, a court’s 
choice of cases is influenced by and, in turn, influences law the court would like 
to elaborate upon. The Supreme Court of Canada appears to have gone out of 
its way to “choose” its BCE decision in order to re-articulate the scope of the 
oppression remedy and its view of the “best interests of the corporation.” This is 
evidenced, in part, by the fact that the remedy was not pleaded by the time the 
case reached the Court on appeal, and that the stakeholder conflict at issue in 
that case was one between bondholders and shareholders that hinged purely on 
economic considerations.80 The current structure of corporate law is therefore 
78. While methods of quantifying the social or environmental consequences of corporate actions 
exist, they may not be widely employed. See Marc J Epstein, “Implementing Corporate 
Sustainability: Measuring and Managing Social and Environmental Impacts,” Strategic 
Finance (January 2008) 25 at 25-26, online: <sfmagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/
sfarchive/2008/01/Implementing-Corporate-Sustainability-Measuring-and-Managing-Social-
and-Environmental-Impacts.pdf>. Epstein notes that:
[t]he constant uncertainty about how much sustainability is necessary, the constantly changing 
emphasis on and costs of implementing sustainability, and the long time horizons necessary to 
measure the financial benefits of sustainability make it difficult to implement sustainability in 
the same way that other corporate strategic initiatives are implemented (ibid at 27).
79. Selin A Malkoc, Gal Zauberman & James R Bettman, “Unstuck from the concrete: 
Carryover effects of abstract mindsets in intertemporal preferences” (2010) 113:2 Org Behav 
& Hum Decision Processes 112 at 115. The authors find that “people’s default mindset is 
concrete and shows high levels of present-bias” (ibid).
80. BCE, supra note 9 at paras 96-121.
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both difficult to move in a deliberate, systemic manner, as a result of accumulated 
precedent and statutory obstacles, but also dynamic, when the right cases make 
their way before the right court.
Conventional “wisdom” is that lawyers are required to advise on the law as it 
exists today, with the possibility of future changes in the law typically having only 
a tangential effect on their analysis, barring a clear indication of impending change 
from a legislature or regulator.81 Given the current structure of the law—one that 
permits boards to consider stakeholder interests, but gives the right to challenge a 
board’s actions (almost) exclusively to shareholders—there seems little reason to 
believe that recent developments in fiduciary law have significantly changed the 
content of legal advice to boards, at least once this advice moves past generalities 
to the resolution of specific conflicts between stakeholders.
This need not, and arguably should not, be the case. In a “compliance-centric” 
environment, it is all too easy to lose sight of the fact that our major institutions 
ultimately function and depend on public trust.82 Such trust emerges from shared 
norms and fair dealing, based on current and past practices and expectations of 
future behaviour. The erosion of such trust, over time, significantly impairs the 
value of any enterprise. In this context, good counsel should address what ought 
to be done in addition to what can be done.83 Hence, for example, in 2012 
the American Bar Association (“ABA”)’s House of Delegates endorsed UN and 
OECD principles and guidelines respecting the responsibilities of corporations 
concerning human rights and urged the legal community to integrate them into 
their practices. The ABA report supporting the resolution referred to ABA Model 
Rule 2.1, the commentary to which notes that “moral and ethical considerations 
impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how the law 
will be applied.”84
81. Bailey H Kuklin, “The Plausibility of Legally Protecting Reasonable Expectations” (1997) 
32:1 Val U L Rev 19 at 27-29.
82. Paul Smith, “Public trust in financial services is returning but we can’t be complacent,” 
The Telegraph (29 March 2016), online: <www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/03/29/
publics-trust-is-returning-but-we-cant-be-complacent>.
83. Edward J Waitzer, “Embracing Our Responsibility,” Lexpert Magazine (July/August 2012) 65.
84. American Bar Association, House of Delegates, Resolution 109 (adopted 6 February 
2012), accompanying report at 5, n 16, online: <www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/domestic_violence1/Resources/Trafficking%20Policies/2012_MY_109.
authcheckdam.pdf>.
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II. THE CANADIAN OPPRESSION REMEDY
The Canadian oppression remedy is one avenue by which the courts have sent a 
strong signal to legal advisers and to boards as to the future trajectory of the law. 
In doing so, the courts have also exposed some of the contradictions within the 
statutory structure of the remedy, providing an opening for legislative reform that 
augments the courts’ movement towards a stakeholder-based vision for corporate 
purpose. In this section, we briefly introduce the oppression remedy, then turn 
to discuss “reasonable expectations,” which lie at the heart of the remedy and 
help explain both the importance of the remedy and its potential for spurring 
future change in corporate behaviour. We then discuss the history and structure 
of the oppression remedy in greater depth, the tensions within the structure of 
this remedy that were exposed by the BCE decision, and possible legislative and 
judicial paths to resolving these tensions.
The Canadian oppression remedy allows certain corporate stakeholders to 
seek redress for breaches that amount to “oppression,” “unfair prejudice,” or “unfair 
disregard” of their interests.85 Incorporated into the Canada Business Corporations 
Act (CBCA), which was enacted in 1975, the remedy was quickly recognized as 
the “broadest, most comprehensive and most open-ended shareholder remedy in 
the common law world … unprecedented in its scope.”86 As the Supreme Court 
of Canada put it, the remedy gives the courts “broad, equitable jurisdiction to 
enforce not just what is legal but what is fair.”87
A. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS – A SCAFFOLD FOR REFORM
In determining whether oppressive conduct has occurred, the courts focus on 
“reasonable expectations,”88 a doctrine that has evolved into a powerful tool by 
which courts and regulators can adapt the law to respond to a changing world.89 
They are particularly relevant to contemporary society where legislative processes’ 
ability to respond to risks to and expectations from the public have become 
constrained by various factors.90 These constraints are reinforced by the growing 
degree of interdependence and interconnectedness that has come to define 
85. BCE, supra note 9 at para 56.
86. Stanley M Beck, “Minority Shareholders’ Rights in the 1980s” in Special Lectures of the Law 
Society of Upper Canada – Corporate Law in the 80s (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 
1982) 311 at 312.
87. BCE, supra note 9 at para 58.
88. Ibid at para 56.
89. Waitzer & Sarro, supra note 14 at 313.
90. See e.g. Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations, supra note 18 at 45-46.
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the world we live in—a world where domestic regulation no longer provides 
adequate instruments to deal with public stewardship challenges.91 As the tension 
between “public expectations” and legislative responsiveness becomes more 
acute, a growing role has emerged for our courts to attach the term “reasonable” 
to nouns such as “expectations” (or “doubt”, “person” and the like) to forge new, 
often radical, legal pathways.
While not without its conceptual challenges, it can be argued that the norm 
of protecting reasonable expectations is a central organizing principle for most 
legal rules.92 As noted above, the concept is explicitly invoked in a number 
of areas of the law, including contract, search and seizure, administrative law, 
fiduciary law, and corporate law. Even in areas of law which do not explicitly use 
“reasonable expectations,” the concept’s influence nonetheless can be observed.93 
Moreover, the standard is used to achieve consistent objectives—targeting actions 
that cause unnecessary or disproportionate harms to others and actions that 
evade or otherwise subvert existing legal frameworks. By definition, “reasonable” 
expectations mean something more than the current law. As the Supreme Court 
of Canada noted in BCE, reasonable expectations “look … beyond legality to 
what is fair, given all of the interests at play” to address conduct that is “wrongful, 
even if it is not actually unlawful.”94
B. HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE OPPRESSION REMEDY
The oppression remedy was first introduced to help protect the reasonable 
expectations of minority shareholders. The UK Parliament enacted the remedy 
to fill a gap left by the common law rule in Foss v Harbottle,95 which held that, 
if a company is wronged, only the company (acting through its management and 
board of directors) can sue for a remedy, and not individual shareholders. In short, 
this rule left minority shareholders of closely-held companies without an effective 
remedy when the majority shareholder exercised its control of the company in 
91. Ibid at 10.
92. Roscoe Pound suggests that one can “explain more phenomena and explain them better by 
saying that the law enforces the reasonable expectations arising out of conduct, relations and 
situations” than by, for instance, adopting the theory that the law enforces obligations only if 
the defendant explicitly consented to these obligations. See Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to 
the Philosophy of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1922) at 189.
93. See e.g. Waitzer & Sarro, supra note 14 at 301-303 (discussing how courts’ willingness to 
pierce the corporate veil in certain circumstances reflects concerns common to the doctrine 
of reasonable expectations).
94. BCE, supra note 9 at para 71.
95. (1843) 67 ER 189, 2 Hare 461.
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a way that disregarded their interests and, as a result, those of the company as a 
whole.96 While the oppression remedy clearly was focused on protecting minority 
shareholders, at least some of the English case law on the remedy hints that the 
remedy could take on a broader scope, noting that the remedy recognizes that
a limited company is more than a mere legal entity, with a personality in law of its 
own: that there is room in company law for recognition of the fact that behind it, 
or amongst it, there are individuals, with rights, expectations and obligations inter se 
which are not necessarily submerged in the company structure.97
The CBCA oppression remedy applies to all corporations (not just closely-held 
corporations) and makes clear that at least some non-shareholder stakeholders can 
gain access to the remedy.98 Oppression remedies of similar scope are provided 
under most of the provincial and territorial corporate law statutes as well.99
The statutory language describing exactly which stakeholders can access the 
remedy is, however, somewhat muddled. The statute places separate limitations 
on (i) the groups of stakeholders with standing to bring a claim for oppression, 
and (ii) the groups of stakeholders on behalf of whom a claim for oppression 
may be brought:
• First, section 241(1) of the CBCA provides that any “complainant” 
has standing to bring an oppression claim. The definition of 
“complainant” is open-ended, comprising any shareholder, director, 
or officer of a corporation, the Director (a government official tasked 
with executing certain responsibilities under the CBCA), and “any 
other person who, in the discretion of a court, is a proper person 
to make an application” for a court order remedying oppression.100
96. Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Poonam Puri, “The Canadian Oppression Remedy Judicially 
Considered: 1995-2001” (2004) 30:1 Queen’s LJ 79 at 85-86. While, at the time the 
oppression remedy was first introduced in England, shareholders could pursue derivative 
actions and actions for winding-up a company, Ben-Ishai and Puri note that these remedies 
were “unsatisfactory” due to derivative cases being “difficult to prove,” and successful 
winding-up actions leading to “the demise of the corporation” (ibid at 86).
97. Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd, [1973] AC 360 at 379 (HL Eng), [1972] 2 All ER 492 
(cited in BCE, supra note 9 at para 60).
98. CBCA, supra note 74, s 241.
99. See Business Corporations Act, RSA 2000, c B-9, s 242; The Business Corporations Act, RSS 
1978, c B-10, s 234; The Corporations Act, CCSM c C225, Pt 2, s 234; Business Corporations 
Act, RSO 1990, c B.16, s 248; Companies Act, RSNS 1989, c 81, Third Schedule, s 5; 
Business Corporations Act, SNB 1981, c B-9.1, s 166; Corporations Act, RSNL 1990, c C-36, 
s 371; Business Corporations Act, SNWT 1996, c 19, s 243, Business Corporations Act, SNWT 
(Nu) 1996, c 19, s 243. See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text for exceptions.
100. CBCA, supra note 74, s 238.
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• Second, section 241(2) of the CBCA provides that, to establish an 
oppression claim, it is necessary that a “security holder, creditor, 
director or officer” of the company have been treated unfairly.101
Several of the stakeholders listed in section 241(2), however, do not 
automatically qualify as “complainants” for purposes of section 241(1)—creditors 
and security holders who are not shareholders, for instance, are listed in section 
241(2), but are not defined as complainants under section 241(1).
Likewise, while the scope of potential “complainants” under section 241(1) 
is limited only by a court’s discretion, section 241(2) suggests that the harm 
must be suffered by a security holder, creditor, director or officer of the company. 
It is not clear why this is the case. The Dickerson Committee report, which 
proposed the inclusion of an oppression remedy in the CBCA and set out the 
structure for the remedy that was ultimately enacted, did not address this gap, 
and more generally did not provide significant guidance as to the intended scope 
of the remedy, instead focusing largely on how the remedy would help protect 
minority shareholders.102
That the CBCA uses the same definition of “complainant” for both the 
oppression and derivative remedies is helpful in interpreting its potential scope. 
The latter remedy allows a complainant to seek leave of the court to bring an 
action on behalf of the corporation and for its benefit.103 The complainant must 
demonstrate that it is acting in good faith and has made reasonable efforts to 
cause the directors to pursue the action on behalf of the corporation.104 The 
court must also be satisfied that the action appears to be in the interests of the 
corporation.105 Since the remedy is intended to benefit the corporation as a 
whole, there is no need to address the question of which specific stakeholders 
have been treated unfairly, and thus, there are no bright line restrictions on the 
types of stakeholders capable of acting as “claimants.”
In practice, the courts have made use of the “proper person” branch of the 
definition of “claimant” to address the apparent disconnect between the criteria 
for standing and for obtaining remedial relief as well as the unique fact scenarios 
101. BCE, supra note 9 at para 45; see also CBCA, supra note 74, s 241. For the full text of section 
241(2), see supra note 74.
102. Robert WV Dickerson et al, Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada, 
vol 1 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971) at paras 484-85 [Dickerson Report]; Jacob S 
Ziegel, “Creditors as Corporate Stakeholders: The Quiet Revolution—An Anglo-Canadian 
Perspective” (1993) 43:3 UTLJ 511 at 527.
103. CBCA, supra note 74, s 239(1).
104. Ibid, s 239(2)(a)-(b).
105. Ibid, s 239(2)(c).
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that would not have been contemplated when the remedy was introduced. 
Since the CBCA oppression remedy was introduced, courts have recognized 
creditors, lessors, licensors, a trustee in bankruptcy, a monitor appointed under 
restructuring proceedings, and a widow of a former shareholder as proper 
persons to bring claims seeking the oppression remedy.106 Two Alberta decisions 
have even concluded that the corporation itself can bring claims seeking the 
substantially similar oppression remedy available under Alberta’s corporate 
statute.107 Logically, the scope of those treated unfairly should coincide with the 
definition of “complainant.”
C. “STAKEHOLDER” AS DEFINED IN BCE
Canadian judicial decisions applying the oppression remedy and fiduciary duties 
reflect a movement from a shareholder-centric view of corporate directors’ duties 
to a view that takes into account the interests of other stakeholders affected by 
the decisions corporate boards make. BCE and Peoples are the best-known of 
these cases; while the cases themselves deal with economic conflicts between 
shareholders and creditors, the Supreme Court of Canada nonetheless used these 
cases as opportunities to state that, depending on the circumstances, it may be 
legitimate for a board to consider the interests of a broad range of stakeholders 
when making decisions, including, but not limited to, “shareholders, employees, 
suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment.”108 This 
understanding of the nature of the duties of corporate directors reflects the 
significant externalities that corporate decisions can produce, as well as the range 
of persons and interests that can be affected by these externalities.109
In BCE, the Court frequently discusses the oppression remedy as a means 
of protecting stakeholder interests, noting that “[t]he oppression remedy is 
grounded in unfair treatment of stakeholders, rather than on legal rights in 
106. Ben-Ishai & Puri, supra note 96 at 104; Ernst & Young, supra note 76 at paras 111-27.
107. Calmont Leasing Ltd v Kredl (1993), [1993] 7 WWR 428 at 460-61, 11 Alta LR (3d) 232 
(QB); Gainers Inc v Pocklington (1992), 132 AR 35 at 65-66, [1992] AWLD 741 (QB).
108. BCE, supra note 9 at para 39 (quoting Peoples, supra note 34 at para 42). The groundwork for 
these statements was arguably laid in earlier cases, including Stelco and Hollinger. See Stelco 
Inc (Re) (2005), 75 OR (3d) 5, 253 DLR (4th) 109 (CA); Catalyst Fund General Partner 
I Inc v Hollinger Inc (2004), [2004] OTC 1025, 1 BLR (4th) 186 (Sup Ct), aff’d (2006), 
79 OR (3d) 288, 266 DLR (4th) 228 (CA). See also Stephanie Ben-Ishai, “The Promise of 
the Oppression Remedy: A Review of Markus Koehnen’s Oppression and Related Remedies” 
(2005) 42:3 Can Bus LJ 450.
109. See Steven L Schwarz, “Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty” (2016) 92:1 
Notre Dame L Rev 1 at 4-5.
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their strict sense”110 and that any oppression analysis must take into account 
“the reasonable expectations of the stakeholders in the context and in regard to 
the relationships at play.”111 But the Court also notes that the CBCA oppression 
remedy as presently framed does not provide protection to all stakeholders—a 
claim can be established only if there was unfair treatment of a security holder, 
creditor, director, or officer for purposes of section 241(2).112
We have already reviewed the perverse effects of structuring and applying 
the oppression remedy in a way that protects some stakeholders and not others. 
Directors and their advisors, seeking to minimize litigation risk, will naturally 
bend to the interests of those stakeholders whose interests receive the greatest 
protection under the law and that have the resources and incentive to challenge 
management’s actions in court. In addition, placing limits on the types of 
stakeholders with access to the oppression remedy that are based on the nature 
of their legal interest in the company seems inconsistent with the remedy’s focus 
on reasonable expectations and fair treatment of stakeholders rather than the 
adjudication of strictly legal rights. In light of this objective, instead of focusing 
on whether a stakeholder can be squeezed into the category of “security holder, 
creditor, director or officer” for purposes of section 241(2), we suggest that 
it makes more sense to focus on whether there was a stakeholder who had a 
reasonable expectation that was not met.
Correcting the confusion arising from the existing structure of section 241, 
exposed in BCE, suggests reform, either in the form of legislative change or 
litigation that leads courts to recognize that the oppression remedy should protect 
a broader range of interests than may currently be contemplated. We review each 
of these possible routes to reform below.
D. LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Legislative change could mean replacing the words “security holder, creditor, 
director or officer” in section 241(2) of the CBCA with “stakeholder.” In other 
words, acts or omissions that are oppressive, prejudicial to, or unfairly disregard 
the interests of any stakeholder would constitute oppression. Using the word 
“stakeholder” gives the oppression remedy greater capacity to adapt to reflect 
the profound effects private enterprise has and can have on society as a whole, 
including both present and future generations. A corresponding change in the 
definition of “complainant” is likely unnecessary: If stakeholders’ interests are 
110. BCE, supra note 9 at para 133.
111. Ibid at para 59.
112. Ibid at para 45.
(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL816
explicitly protected by the oppression remedy, a court should not have difficulty 
recognizing that the equities favour allowing stakeholders to access this remedy.113 
This would be consistent with the view of the Ontario Divisional Court 
(adopting the reasoning in BCE) that the oppression remedy should address 
the “vulnerability … of those [who have] a genuine stake in the affairs of the 
corporation but no control over its conduct.”114
Far from being a vague concept, the concept of “stakeholder” has been judicially 
defined in Peoples and BCE. New stakeholders could be recognized based on the 
reasonable expectations of the parties.115 These reasonable expectations can be 
shaped, and their application made more predictable, through corporate conduct. 
For example, many companies publicly state who they view their stakeholders to 
be, often going beyond the list of stakeholders included in Peoples and BCE to 
include groups such as non-governmental organizations and suppliers.116 Robert 
G. Eccles and Tim Youmans have argued that companies should go further by 
publishing an annual “Statement of Significant Audiences and Materiality” that 
makes clear which stakeholders the board views as significant, and over what time 
horizon the board considers these stakeholders’ interests.117 Such a statement 
would have the dual effect of giving a company board an opportunity to reflect on 
whether its decision-making processes adequately take into account the interests 
113. The recognition of an applicant as a “proper person” to bring an oppression case is within the 
court’s discretion, and the exercise of this discretion is based on the equities of the case. See 
First Edmonton Place Ltd v 315888 Alberta Ltd (1988), 40 BLR 28 at 62, 60 Alta LR (2d) 
122 (QB) var’d (1989), 45 BLR 110, 71 Alta LR (2d) 61 (CA).
114. 1413910 Ontario Inc (Bull’s Eye Steakhouse & Grill) v McLennan (2009), 309 DLR (4th) 756 
at para 34, 249 OAC 333 (Div Ct).
115. See J Anthony VanDuzer, “Who May Claim Relief from Oppression: The Complainant in 
Canadian Corporate Law” (1993) 25:3 Ottawa L Rev 463 (suggesting that courts already use 
reasonable expectations to determine whether an applicant qualifies as a “complainant”).
116. For example, each of the “Big Five” Canadian banks publicly lists the groups it views as its 
stakeholders. See Bank of Montreal, “Stakeholder Engagement,” online: <www.bmo.com/
home/about/banking/corporate-responsibility/our-approach/engaging-our-stakeholders>; 
Bank of Nova Scotia, Scotiabank Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2016 at 7 <www.
scotiabank.com/corp/downloads/EN_2016_CSR_Report.pdf>; Canadian Imperial 
Bank of Commerce, CIBC 2016 Corporate Responsibility Report and Public Accountability 
Statement at 10-12 <www.cibc.com/content/dam/about_cibc/corporate_responsibility/
pdfs/cibc-crr-2016-en.pdf>; Royal Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada 
Corporate Citizenship Report 2016 at 3 <www.rbc.com/community-sustainability/_
assets-custom/pdf/RBC-CCR-Report-2016-e.pdf>; Toronto-Dominion Bank, 
2016 TD Corporate Responsibility Report at 5, <www.td.com/document/PDF/
corporateresponsibility/2016-Final-CRR_EN.pdf>.
117. Robert G Eccles & Tim Youmans, “Materiality in Corporate Governance: The Statement of 
Significant Audiences and Materiality” (2016) 28:2 J Applied Corp Fin 39.
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of its stakeholders, and provide a court with a framework (albeit a non-binding 
one) for identifying stakeholders as well as their reasonable expectations.
We also note that providing stakeholders with access to the oppression 
remedy does not mean that corporate boards would be obligated to weight the 
interests of all stakeholders equally, or that all stakeholders would stand on an 
equal footing when establishing a reasonable expectation. BCE makes it clear that 
the corporate decision-making process is context-specific, with some stakeholders’ 
interests looming larger in some contexts than in others, and that whether or not 
a stakeholder can establish a reasonable expectation will depend on a variety of 
factors, including “general commercial practice; the nature of the corporation; 
the relationship between the parties; past practice; steps the claimant could have 
taken to protect itself; representations and agreements; and the fair resolution of 
conflicting interests between corporate stakeholders.”118
Broadening the scope of the oppression remedy in this way creates a 
mechanism for preventing corporate decisions like that reached by DuPont, 
as discussed in Section I above. Recognizing stakeholders as parties who can 
sue when corporate decisions significantly affect their interests and violate their 
reasonable expectations would achieve two ends. First, by recognizing the rights of 
non-financial stakeholders, the law encourages directors to view costs imposed on 
these stakeholders not as externalities, but as costs borne by the corporation itself 
through its stakeholders. One of the functions of the law is to make these kinds 
of normative claims that are intended to influence future behaviour.119 Second, 
the wide range of remedies available under the oppression remedy, which include 
personal liability on the part of directors, could pose a significant deterrent to 
behaviour that unjustifiably harms the interests of affected stakeholders.120
The potential risks attaching to this kind of reform are less serious than 
may first appear. While it has been suggested that an expansion of the scope 
of the oppression remedy would lead managers to “face conflicting influences 
that could threaten the coherence of their approach,” as a result of “sharply 
different interests hav[ing] a possible influence over management because of the 
118. BCE, supra note 9 at para 72.
119. Cass R Sunstein, “On the Expressive Function of Law” (1996) 144:5 U Pa L Rev 
2021 at 2024-25.
120. Wilson v Alharayeri, 2017 SCC 39 at paras 47-48, [2017] 1 SCR 1037 [Wilson] (holding 
that personal liability may be imposed under section 241(3) of the CBCA if the director 
“exercised—or failed to have exercised—his or her powers so as to effect the oppressive 
conduct” and “the imposition of personal liability [is] fit in all the circumstances” 
(ibid at para 47).
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threat of litigation,”121 recent case law suggests that allowing all stakeholders to 
access the oppression remedy would not lead courts to second guess reasonable 
balances of interests reached by a board of directors. For example, in Air Canada 
Pilots Assn v Air Canada Ace Aviation Holdings Inc, a pilots’ union sought to 
use the oppression remedy to, in effect, reopen a plan of reorganization that 
it had been involved in negotiating. While the claim was rejected on the basis 
of the union not constituting a “proper person” to bring the claim (as a result 
of its not being a creditor),122 the court also explored in detail the nature of 
the reasonable expectations asserted by the union and concluded that they were 
being met, noting that union members “are in a stronger, more economically 
protected position because of the restructuring of the previously insolvent 
Air Canada,”123 and that the union was substantially involved in negotiating 
this restructuring.124 The analysis is similar to that which has been applied to 
holders of debt securities, finding that if the debtholders were aware of risks 
and agreed to contractual terms notwithstanding this awareness, they are not 
entitled to attempt to use the oppression remedy to reopen the deal that they had 
negotiated.125 In short, it does not appear that expanding the oppression remedy 
to encompass all stakeholders would severely upset the remedy’s functioning; 
rather, it would allow the remedy to function in the way generally described to 
directors of corporations, as a way in which stakeholders can seek redress for 
violations of their reasonable expectations.126
While one could argue that a change of this kind in one corporate law 
statute may lead companies to continue into a jurisdiction with a more restrictive 
oppression remedy, history does not appear to support this hypothesis. While 
most of the provincial oppression remedies resemble that set forth in the CBCA, 
the oppression remedies in British Columbia and Yukon relate only to shareholder 
interests, while the remedy in Quebec relates only to the interests of security 
121. Edward Iacobucci, “Indeterminacy and the Canadian Supreme Court’s Approach to 
Corporate Fiduciary Duties” (2009) 48:2 Can Bus LJ 232 at 247.
122. Air Canada, supra note 76 at para 85 (“ACPA’s present and future members are, of course, 
employees entitled to wages, related benefit payments and pension benefits (from the pension 
plan trustee) as they become due in the future. In my view, this does not constitute ACPA a 
‘creditor’ of Air Canada in any legal sense, and in particular, within the meaning of s. 241 (2) 
[of the CBCA].” (ibid)).
123. Ibid at para 60.
124. Ibid at para 31.
125. Holders of 9.375% Senior Unsecured Notes of Crystallex International Corporation v Crystallex 
International Corporation, 2010 ONCA 364 at para 16, 263 OAC 137.
126. Torys LLP, supra note 59 at 19.
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holders, directors, and officers.127 Prince Edward Island’s corporate law statute 
does not include an oppression remedy.128 The absence of any apparent concern 
about companies continuing into these jurisdictions would seem to indicate that 
changes resulting in differences in the scope of the remedy are unlikely to lead to 
such a result.129
E. JUDICIAL REFORM
Legislative reform has the advantage of signaling to boards and legal practitioners 
that the scope of the oppression remedy has expanded, providing an opportunity 
for proactive changes in the conduct of boards and their advisers. However, given 
the right case, it should be possible to effect a similar result through judicial 
reform. Security holders clearly have standing to bring claims in response to 
concerns that directors and officers have failed to properly evaluate systemic (e.g., 
climate) risks and develop appropriate mitigation and adaptation strategies. The 
broad language of the remedy gives ample scope for such a claim. Moreover, 
the Supreme Court of Canada recently affirmed that corporate directors may 
be personally liable in an oppression action where the director (or officer) is 
implicated in the oppressive conduct and the imposition of personal liability is 
“fit in all of the circumstances.”130
Time and again, courts have interpreted the oppression remedy expansively 
to address unjust conduct, recognizing a range of stakeholders as “proper persons” 
to bring claims under the remedy despite their not being named in sections 
238 or 241(2) of the CBCA.131 Moreover, the oppression remedy has been 
characterized as an open-ended standard, designed to reflect the fact that “it is 
127. Business Corporations Act, SBC 2002, c 57, s 227(2); Business Corporations Act, RSY 2002, 
c 20, s 243(2); Business Corporations Act, CQLR c 31.1, s 450.
128. Companies Act, RSPEI 1988, c C-14.
129. While in recent years, different jurisdictions have cited competition as a motive for efforts to 
modernize their corporate laws, there appears to be no prospect of US-style competition for 
corporate charters coming to Canada. See Glenford Jameson, “Competing with Ourselves: 
Supply-Side Competition for Corporate Charters in Canada” (2013) 50:4 Alta L Rev 843 
at 869. Despite this recent trend, the federal and provincial corporate law statutes remain 
substantially similar, and are characterized as such by corporate counsel. See e.g. Davies 
Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP, Doing Business in Canada, 9th ed (Toronto: Davies Ward 
Phillips & Vineberg LLP, 2014) at 16-17, online: <www.dwpv.com/-/media/Files/PDF_
EN/2014-2007/Doing_Business_in_Canada_9th_ed_En.ashx?la=en>; Stikeman Elliott LLP, 
Doing Business in Canada: A Legal Overview (Toronto: Stikeman Elliott LLP, 2016) at C2, 
online: <www.stikeman.com/en-ca/kh/guides/Doing-Business-in-Canada>.
130. Wilson, supra note 120 at paras 31-33.
131. See supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
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generally assumed that participants in corporations would bargain for protection 
against oppression and unfair prejudice if bargaining were costless.”132 Where a 
court finds that the parties have not addressed the problematic conduct, it should 
attempt to construct the bargain the parties could reasonably be expected to have 
agreed to as a result of fully informed (and costless) bargaining.133 In this manner, 
the oppression remedy could be used by the courts to reshape corporate law by 
changing to whom management and directors must be responsible.134
If the best interests of the corporation are defined broadly—in terms of 
decisions that are intended to advance its operational and financial sustainability—
the interests of a broad set of stakeholders (beyond those specifically enumerated 
in section 241(2) of the CBCA) should become relevant factors in determining 
“reasonable expectations.”
Such a focus on the public interest, and on outcomes that may be 
non-economic in the short term, as independent and legitimate values is 
consistent with the shifting focus of jurisprudence in Canadian insolvency law.135 
Consider, for example, a recent decision affirming the status of a court-appointed 
monitor under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (“CCAA”)136 
as a complainant under the oppression remedy.  Ernst & Young Inc v Essar Global 
Fund Limited (Ernst & Young),137 a 2017 decision of the Court of Appeal for 
Ontario, confirmed the existence of one pathway by which pensioners, retirees, 
and governments can have their interests represented in oppression proceedings. 
In that case, these stakeholders were creditors of a company under restructuring, 
and the court-appointed monitor brought an oppression claim arguing that their 
reasonable expectations had been violated. The company, acting at the behest of its 
shareholder, transferred core assets to a related party with the benefit of a change 
of control clause that gave it an effective veto right over any restructuring by the 
company.138 The court sided with the monitor, and concluded that the reasonable 
expectations of the stakeholders it purported to represent had been violated:
132. Brian R Cheffins, “An Economic Analysis of the Oppression Remedy: Working Towards a 
More Coherent Picture of Corporate Law” (1990) 40:4 UTLJ 775 at 789.
133. Ibid at 793-94.
134. VanDuzer, supra note 115.
135. Janis Sarra & Edward Waitzer, “Climate Change—A Case Study/Tipping Point for 
Rebalancing Interests in Insolvency Law?” in Janis P Sarra and The Honourable Barbara E 
Romaine, eds, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2016 (Toronto: Carswell, 2017) 643.
136. RSC 1985, c C-36.
137. Ernst & Young, supra note 76.
138. Ibid at para 70.
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[I]t would not be reasonable to expect that the shareholder would have the right to 
veto any restructuring in a CCAA proceeding in which it was not an applicant and 
have the right to prefer its own interests over those of others such as the retirees, 
pensioners, trade creditors, and employees.139
The Court specifically noted that “[a] monitor owes duties to all stakeholders, 
not just creditors.”140 Moreover, in articulating the factors a CCAA supervising 
judge should consider when exercising discretion as to whether a monitor 
should be authorized to be a complainant, the court focused on whether the 
claim “has a restructuring purpose, that is to say, materially advances or removes 
an impediment to a restructuring.”141 By implication, this extends the scope of 
potential “complainants” beyond those named in section 241(2) of the CBCA.
The decision indicates that, if presented with compelling facts and 
arguments that fit within the existing legal framework, courts are willing to 
apply the oppression remedy in ways that reflect the reasonable expectations 
of non-shareholder stakeholders. This is consistent with the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s view of the oppression remedy as enabling courts to frame new norms 
in response to reasonable expectations.142
The oppression remedy as currently framed offers other potential pathways 
for stakeholders to form coalitions to assert reasonable expectations in an 
oppression claim. The first step would be to demonstrate that the interests of 
stakeholders not currently enumerated in section 241(2) of the CBCA can be 
aligned with the interests of at least one of the stakeholders currently listed in that 
provision—this will likely mean pursuing litigation in tandem with a security 
holder or creditor with whom the stakeholder’s interests are aligned. Second, 
it would be necessary to show that those advocating for the stakeholder should be 
allowed to participate as interveners in proceedings brought by security holders 
or other complainants. A more ambitious option would be to argue that these 
groups are “proper persons” to bring the oppression claim in their own right.
Future generations have long been characterized as “creditors” internationally. 
For example, the Brundtland Report comments that “[w]e borrow environmental 
capital from future generations with no intention or prospect of repaying.”143 
Given the existing case law on this matter, however, it appears unlikely that courts 
139. Ibid at para 160.
140. Ibid at para 96.
141. Ibid at para 123.
142. Waitzer & Sarro, supra note 14.
143. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) at para 25, online: <www.un-documents.net/
our-common-future.pdf>.
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would adopt such an expansive definition of creditor.144 Nonetheless, one could 
argue that the systemic threat climate-related risks pose to shareholders, creditors, 
directors and officers could form a basis for litigation claiming that inaction in 
the face of this threat disregards these stakeholders’ interests (as well as those of 
the corporation) and reasonable expectations. The increasing focus of securities 
regulators on the disclosure of environmental risks suggests that these risks should 
be viewed as material to investors.145 The conduct of investors themselves, who 
have increasingly focused on climate-related risks associated with their portfolio 
companies,146 provides further evidence of the link between shareholder interests 
and environmental sustainability.
In determining whether it is “just and equitable” to deem an environmental 
or other non-governmental organization to be a “proper person” to bring an 
oppression claim, a court could look to the test currently used for determining 
whether such a group can gain public interest standing to challenge a government 
action: whether (1) the party raises a “serious justiciable issue” and has a “genuine 
interest” or “real stake” in the issue, and (2) “in all the circumstances, the proposed 
suit is a reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the courts.”147 
Even under this test, however, recognition could be difficult. While one could 
argue that the interests of individual shareholders in environmental and social 
matters are too diffuse to rely on them to bring oppression claims relating to 
these issues on their own, or that a public interest group is the only vehicle for 
representing the interests of future generations, the presence of large, institutional 
shareholders with a long-term outlook would seem to undercut this argument. 
The better prospect may be to follow the class action model and “partner” with a 
sympathetic shareholder who can act as a claimant, with the “ineligible” claimant 
seeking to participate in the proceedings as an intervener. Such status is typically 
granted to parties that bring a fresh perspective to proceedings that are of at least 
some public importance.148
144. Air Canada, supra note 76 at para 85.
145. Cynthia A Williams, “Disclosure of Information Concerning Climate Change: Liability Risks 
and Opportunities,” (2017) Commonwealth Climate and Law Initiative Working Paper 
Series at 15-16, online: <hennickcentre.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/CCLI-Disclosure-
Paper-October-30.pdf>.
146. Ibid at 3, 26.
147. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society v Canada (Attorney General), 
2012 SCC 45 at para 37, [2012] 2 SCR 524.
148. Reference re Workers’ Compensation Act, 1983 (Newfoundland) (1989), [1989] 2 SCR 335 at 
340, 76 Nfld & PEIR 185.
WAITzER, SARRO,  JuDICIAL ACTIvISm AND CORPORATE PuRPOSE 823
Perhaps the most important element of any test case will be concrete evidence 
of a reasonable expectation that has been violated by the corporation. This means 
more than simply asserting that a corporate action has harmed a particular 
stakeholder: The business judgment rule protects corporate actions that balance 
the competing interests of different classes of stakeholders, so long as the action 
taken lies within a reasonable range of alternatives.149 In addition, to the extent 
the harms asserted resulted from risks willingly undertaken by a stakeholder as 
part of a bargain, such as a plan of arrangement (as was the case in Air Canada), 
an oppression claim would seem unlikely to succeed.150
Rather, it will be necessary to demonstrate not only that harm has 
occurred or is occurring, but that the harm resulted from a defective corporate 
decision-making process that disregarded the interests of affected stakeholders, 
and in which stakeholders had no opportunity to bargain to protect their 
interests (such as in Ernst & Young).151 Below, we suggest two possible examples 
of defective decision-making processes resulting in harm that could form a basis 
for asserting a violation of reasonable expectations.
The first is a scenario like that in the DuPont settlement, in which 
management understood that emitting C8 toxins into the atmosphere would 
cause specific harms to the environment and human health, but appeared to have 
evaluated these harms purely as a potential financial liability.152 In other words, 
rather than weighing the known human health and environmental effects of their 
actions on all affected stakeholders, management’s decision to pollute reflected a 
weighting only of the potential financial effects of their actions on shareholders 
and other financial stakeholders. Perhaps as a result of this incomplete process 
for evaluating how best to serve the long-term interests of DuPont, the board 
disregarded a third option: “investing in incineration techniques that would have 
mitigated many of the damages caused to the community and the sanctions later 
paid by DuPont.”153 Groups representing the interests of the environment and 
those who suffered adverse health effects from the company’s actions, acting in 
tandem with a shareholder with a long-termist outlook, might have asserted a 
reasonable expectation that all of the known and potential effects of a decision to 
pollute on all affected stakeholders should have weighed on the board’s decision, 
149. BCE, supra note 9 at para 40.
150. Air Canada, supra note 76 at para 84.
151. Ernst & Young, supra note 76.
152. Shapira & Zingales, supra note 29 at 2, 8 (management identified litigation, regulatory 
intervention and reputational harm as potential negative financial effects of polluting).
153. Ibid at 2-3.
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and that had the board properly considered these effects, it at a minimum would 
have taken action to mitigate these potential effects.
The second is a scenario like that in NRG Energy, in which the balance 
of interests adopted by the board is colourable due to the visible influence of 
a particular constituency of shareholders over that decision. NRG Energy’s 
management previously agreed on an ambitious plan to curb its greenhouse 
gas emissions over the long-term and to invest in green energy, only to 
reverse themselves under pressure from hedge funds.154 One could argue that 
management’s plan to mitigate its greenhouse gas emissions, while at the same 
time cutting costs, reflected a reasonable balance of the interests of its stakeholders, 
and that the wholesale unraveling of this plan reflected a narrow focus on serving 
the financial interests of a particular subset of stakeholders (and keeping the 
current board in office) to the exclusion of other stakeholders’ interests—the 
opposite of the “fair treatment” expected of boards under BCE.155
In summary, to achieve reform of the oppression remedy through judicial 
means, it is likely that stakeholders would need to find ways in which their 
interests align with those of the stakeholders enumerated in section 241(2) 
of the CBCA, and find allies within these groups, to pursue litigation that 
focuses on defective decision-making processes that result in concrete harms 
to stakeholders. The silver lining of the muddled statutory drafting is that this 
type of litigation may provide a compelling stimulus and focus for engagement 
between companies, their institutional shareholders, and other stakeholders, and, 
as a result, reduce the pressure companies currently face to pursue the short-term 
interests of certain shareholders at the expense of the long-term interests of other 
stakeholders. Recent collaborative initiatives focused on shared responsibility for 
long-term thinking could be accelerated.156
III. CONCLUSION
We have tried, in this article, to trace the manner in which Canadian courts have 
moved towards a redefined corporate purpose—one that is timely and responsive 
to “reasonable expectations.” Not entirely coincidentally, corporate leaders and 
long-term institutional investors both increasingly struggle with the challenge 
of managing system level opportunities, risks, and rewards that typically extend 
154. Coffee, supra note 52 at 36-38.
155. BCE, supra note 9 at para 64.
156. See e.g. the Strategic Investor Initiative of CECP (www.cecp.co), or the work of the Investor 
Stewardship Group (www.isgframework.org), and FCLT Global (fcltglobal.org).
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beyond their personal time horizons (in their organizational leadership roles), 
in the face of powerful short-term incentives, myopic political forces and 
backward-looking legal advice.
In a period of “thin” political markets,157 this is a classic opportunity for 
judicial activism. This is not novel. Consider, for example, the 1932 decision 
of Judge Learned Hand of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
The T.J. Hooper.158 Judge Hand concluded that tugboat owners were liable in 
negligence for loss of cargos in a storm because they failed to issue short-wave 
receivers to operators, on the basis that they were readily available at a reasonable 
cost and could have prevented the loss of cargo, even though the receivers 
were newly-developed, not required by regulation, and a rarity on tug boats. 
In concluding that following current market practice can constitute negligence, 
Judge Hand held as follows:
[I]n most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is 
never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new 
and available devices. It may never set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages. 
Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so imperative even 
their universal disregard will not excuse their omission.159
This willingness to push beyond current practice to require market participants 
to be proactive in responding to new developments and changing circumstances 
sounds remarkably similar to the Supreme Court of Canada’s discussion of 
“looking beyond legality, to what is fair, given all of the interests at play” to address 
conduct that is “wrongful even if it is not actually unlawful.”160 The immediate 
opportunity is to align corporate law remedies to better enable stakeholders to 
meaningfully engage and assist corporate boards to best ensure sustainability and 
growth, and to be able to impose discipline when that does not occur. Absent 
some mechanism to accelerate legislative responsiveness and reform, judicial 
157. See Rebecca Henderson & Karthik Ramanna, Do Managers Have a Role to Play in Sustaining 
the Institutions of Capitalism? (Center for Effective Public Management at Brookings, 2015) 
at 1. This term describes circumstances where “the political process of determining the 
institutions of capitalism is ‘thin,’ in that managers find themselves with specialized technical 
knowledge unavailable to outsiders and with little political resistance from the general 
interest” (ibid). In such circumstances, Henderson and Ramanna argue, managers have a 
moral duty to help sustain market institutions, “even if this entails acting at the expense of 
corporate profits,” adding that acting in accordance with this duty also serves the long-term 
interests of managers (ibid).
158. The TJ Hooper, 60 F (2d) 737 (2d Cir 1932).
159. Ibid at 738 [emphasis added].
160. BCE, supra note 9 at para 71 (quoting Dickerson Report, supra note 102 at para 485).
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activism is likely to carry the day. To be clear, this is not without challenges.161 
On the other hand, courts are attuned to reasonable expectations—something 
our regulatory and legislative processes appear increasingly incapable of doing.
To end where we began, with the words of then Chancellor Allen, “and so 
on, and so on, evermore.”162
161. In addition to those we have described, these would include the costs of seeking relief, 
the lack of specialized judicial expertise or accountability, the lack of the process that is 
central to legislative or administrative policy-making, and the tendency of “hard facts” to 
make “bad law.”
162. Allen, supra note 10 at 281.
